The Seventh Circuit has held that the Hague Service Convention bars service by email in China. For online sellers whose marketplace accounts were frozen and swept in a Northern District of Illinois Schedule A case, that holding is not academic.
For a plain-language explanation written for sellers, view Amazon Seller Account Frozen by a Trademark Lawsuit.
Schedule A Cases
The Schedule A case is built for speed. A brand owner files a single complaint in the Northern District of Illinois naming dozens or hundreds of online storefronts on an exhibit, obtains an ex parte temporary restraining order that freezes the sellers’ marketplace accounts, serves the defendants by email under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), and then takes default judgments against everyone who does not appear. The model works because the defendants are usually overseas, usually small, and usually unable to justify the cost of retaining United States counsel to defend a claim in a court thousands of miles away. Frozen funds are transferred to satisfy the judgment, the case closes, and the seller absorbs the loss as a cost of doing business on Amazon.
On May 29, 2026, the Seventh Circuit disrupted that model. In Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., 177 F.4th 793 (7th Cir. 2026), Judge Kirsch, writing for a panel that also included Judges Jackson-Akiwumi and Pryor, held that where the Hague Service Convention applies, it supplies the exclusive permissible means of service, and that no provision of the Convention authorizes service by email in China. The court reversed the denial of a Chinese defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment and remanded. Its summary is worth quoting: “if the Hague Service Convention applies, then service was improper because the Convention prohibits service by email in China.” Id. at 801.
What the Court Actually Decided
The reasoning is straightforward and follows Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988). Article 1 makes the Convention applicable in all civil and commercial matters where a judicial document must be transmitted for service abroad. Relying on Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 & n.15 (1987), which described that mandatory language as a “model exclusivity provision,” and on Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S. 271, 273 (2017), the court concluded that the Convention “sets out the permitted methods of service and excludes all others.” 177 F.4th at 800. Structure confirms it: Articles 11 and 19, which preserve service methods the Convention does not itself provide for, would be superfluous if the Convention were merely permissive.
Email appears nowhere among the authorized methods. The court declined to resolve the long-running district court dispute over whether email is a “postal channel” within Article 10(a), compare Luxottica Group S.p.A. v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule “A”, 391 F. Supp. 3d 816, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2019), with NBA Properties, Inc. v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Associations Identified in Schedule “A”, 549 F. Supp. 3d 790, 798 (N.D. Ill. 2021), because China has formally objected to Article 10 in any event. The route is closed either way, and Rule 4(f)(3), which reaches only means “not prohibited by international agreement,” does not rescue the plaintiff. The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in Smart Study Co. v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, 164 F.4th 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2025), and the Third Circuit did so in a nonprecedential decision, SEC v. Lahr, No. 22-2497, 2024 WL 3518309, at *3 & n.12 (3d Cir. July 24, 2024).
One preliminary point is worth noting because it forecloses an argument plaintiffs have been making. Kangol served by sending an email containing a link to a website where the complaint, temporary restraining order, and summons could be found, and argued that transmitting a link is not transmitting a “document” at all. The court found the argument forfeited and, in any event, “hardly credible.” 177 F.4th at 799. Link-based service is service, and it is subject to the Convention.
The court did not, however, hold that every emailed Schedule A default is void. It remanded on the threshold question, because Article 1 provides that the Convention “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” District courts handling Schedule A cases, the panel observed, typically require plaintiffs to make “reasonably diligent efforts to ascertain and verify [the] defendant’s mailing address” before treating an address as unknown, quoting NBA Properties, 549 F. Supp. 3d at 796. Whether Kangol made those efforts is now a question for Judge Coleman on remand.
That threshold is where most of the fighting will occur, and it is not a comfortable place for plaintiffs to stand. Kangol’s own motion offers a fair sample of the genre: it represented that identifying the defendants was “very difficult” because they “are primarily Chinese entities that sell counterfeit goods on online sales platforms and typically do not disclose reliable information about their identities and locations in connection with their online storefronts.” On appeal it added that its search had in fact produced several conflicting addresses, which it characterized as stalls at an open-air market; Hangzhou responded that its address was known and easily discoverable. That is the shape the dispute will take across the docket. Since the INFORM Consumers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45f, online marketplaces have been required to collect and verify the identity and business address of high-volume third-party sellers, and to disclose that information to consumers, subject to limited exceptions for sellers without a separate business address. Much of it appears on the storefront page itself, and what does not is available from the platform on request or subpoena. A plaintiff who ran no search, sent no subpoena, and made no request to the marketplace before declaring the address unknown will have difficulty establishing diligence. So will a plaintiff whose own exhibits, seller-account records, or prelitigation correspondence contain the address it told the court it could not find.
The remand is testing that question now. On July 13, 2026, Judge Coleman referred the case to Magistrate Judge Weisman for discovery to clarify the jurisdictional issue. At a status hearing on July 28, Kangol took the position that a full record already exists, that email service was appropriate, and that the district court has enough before it to rule. Hangzhou answered that it needs to know what efforts Kangol made to ascertain its address and, critically, when those efforts were made — before service, or only after the motion to vacate was filed. Kangol has asserted privilege over some of that material. The magistrate directed Hangzhou to serve discovery or propose stipulations, with a joint status report due September 22, 2026, and the district court set its own status for October 2. However Judge Coleman resolves it, Hangzhou has framed the right question. Diligence is measured as of the representation made to the court when alternative service was sought; it cannot be reconstructed after the seller appears. Any seller raising this argument should press for the dates, and should expect a privilege fight over the search itself.
Why Closed Cases Are Not Necessarily Closed
Improper service means the district court never acquired personal jurisdiction, and a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void under Rule 60(b)(4). That distinction matters, because relief from a void judgment is not discretionary. Although denial of a motion to vacate is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion, the Kangol panel applied a “less deferential” standard, because “no court has the discretion to refuse to vacate [a] judgment once it recognizes its lack of jurisdiction.” 177 F.4th at 798 (quoting Philos Technologies, Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc., 645 F.3d 851, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Two further features of the opinion are significant for sellers who have been sitting on a stale default. First, timing. In Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026), the Supreme Court confirmed that Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time requirement applies to void-judgment motions, but it also recognized that the requirement imposes no fixed limit and that “in the context of a default judgment, it might be reasonable for a defendant not to seek relief before learning about a plaintiff’s attempted enforcement.” Id. at 160. The Kangol facts show what that means in practice. Default judgment was entered in May 2024. Kangol collected from the Amazon account sometime between January and February 2025. Hangzhou moved to vacate in February 2025, roughly ten months after judgment but no more than two months after enforcement, and the court held the motion timely.
The lesson is about which date starts the clock. A seller looking at a judgment entered a year or two ago naturally assumes it has waited far too long to do anything about it. But the period the court measured ran from the day Hangzhou learned that Kangol was collecting, not from the day judgment was entered, and measured that way the seller had moved quickly.
Second, waiver. Hangzhou negotiated with the plaintiff for ten months before appearing, and still prevailed on the service question. The court held that Kangol had forfeited its waiver argument by raising it for the first time on appeal, but went on to state that it would find no waiver in any event: under Hedeen International, LLC v. Zing Toys, Inc., 811 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2016), a defendant waives a service objection only by giving the plaintiff a reasonable expectation that it will defend on the merits or by causing the court to expend effort that would be wasted, and preliminary activity such as settlement discussion does neither. See American Patriot Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Mutual Risk Management, Ltd., 364 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th Cir. 2004). Sellers who tried to settle and then went quiet have not forfeited the argument.
There is a cautionary note in the opinion as well. Hangzhou separately argued that the judgment’s directive to third parties to turn over funds was inconsistent with Illinois post-judgment procedure and therefore violated Rule 69(a)(1). That argument failed, not on its merits but because it had been raised below in cursory form and developed only in reply. 177 F.4th at 798–99. The turnover mechanics in these judgments are worth attacking, but the argument has to be made properly the first time.
The Service Problem Is Not the Only Problem
Kangol arrived two months after Liu v. Monthly, 170 F.4th 1090 (7th Cir. 2026), in which Judge Kirsch also wrote for the court, vacating a Schedule A default judgment for want of personal jurisdiction and remanding with instructions to dismiss. Judge Blakey had found jurisdiction because sixteen China-based defendants operated Walmart.com storefronts offering shipping to the District of Columbia and the forty-eight contiguous states and had, he found, sold to Illinois residents. The record did not support the last point. The plaintiff’s evidence consisted of screenshots of a Walmart checkout page showing the accused product, a Chicago shipping address, and an estimated total — an order that was possible, not an order that was placed. Id. at 1093. Even the plaintiff’s own temporary restraining order motion had claimed only that the products “were offered for sale” to Illinois residents. That finding was clear error, and without a forum sale what remained was an accessible, interactive website, which under Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 400 (7th Cir. 2020), does not permit a defendant to be haled into an Illinois court. Id. at 1094.
The limit of that holding matters. Liu leaves NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 623–27 (7th Cir. 2022) intact, where an accessible storefront combined with a completed sale into Illinois sustained jurisdiction. A plaintiff who makes a test purchase and documents delivery still has its forum contact, and the sophisticated filers now do exactly that. What Liu forecloses is the shortcut of treating the capacity to sell as the sale itself.
District judges have grown skeptical as well. In Eicher Motors Ltd. v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule “A”, 794 F. Supp. 3d 543 (N.D. Ill. 2025), Judge Kness denied an ex parte temporary restraining order and observed that Schedule A cases rarely, if ever, satisfy the requirements for that relief.
The practical consequence is that a seller evaluating a Schedule A judgment now has three independent lines of attack: whether service complied with the Convention, whether the court had personal jurisdiction over that particular seller, and whether the seller was properly joined with the other defendants in the first place. The joinder point is not hypothetical in this district. In Kangol itself, Judge Coleman raised joinder on her own before any defendant appeared, directed the plaintiff to file a supplemental memorandum addressing the propriety of joining twenty-five defendants under Rule 20(a)(2), citing Estée Lauder Cosmetics Ltd. v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, No. 19-cv-7878, 2020 WL 433870 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2020), and gave leave to amend against a smaller subset. Any one of these grounds can support vacatur; together they change the settlement arithmetic considerably.
A Candid Word About Limits
None of this makes Schedule A litigation go away. Kangol is a remand, not a dismissal. The panel expressly declined to reach either Hangzhou’s Article 15 objection to entry of the default judgment or its claim to recover the money already transferred, holding both premature until the district court decides whether the Convention applies — and as of this writing, more than three months after the mandate issued, that court has not decided it. The case is in jurisdictional discovery. A seller who files tomorrow should expect the same, and should budget for it. Plaintiffs who use the Chinese Central Authority under Article 5 will serve validly, and although that route is slow and expensive, it is available. Sellers located in Hong Kong, where the Convention’s declarations differ from those applicable to the mainland, may stand differently, and domestic sellers are unaffected. Trademark counterfeiting claims that were meritorious before Kangol remain meritorious after it; a service defect defeats a judgment, not the underlying claim, and a plaintiff willing to spend the money can serve properly and refile. Vacatur is also not automatic in the sense of being cheap. It requires counsel, a motion, and often a fight over funds the plaintiff has already spent. The stakes are understood on both sides: the appeal drew amici including two law professors, two Chinese e-commerce companies, and, through counsel who regularly bring these cases, Chrome Hearts, Costa Del Mar, Deckers Outdoor, and a trade association formed around e-commerce enforcement.
The question for any given seller is therefore commercial as much as legal. Where a plaintiff swept a modest sum and the seller has left the platform, the cost of pursuing relief may exceed the recovery. Where the frozen or transferred amount is substantial, where the seller intends to keep selling in the United States, or where the judgment sits on the record and interferes with account reinstatement, the calculus favors moving to vacate the judgment. I would want to see the service record, the platform’s notice to the seller, the date the funds moved, and whatever the plaintiff filed in support of its service motion before advising either way.
What Sellers and Their Advisors Should Do Now
Preserve everything, and understand that the seller carries the burden on jurisdiction. The platform notice of the account freeze, the emails the plaintiff sent, the storefront’s registration and disclosure records, and above all the transaction history showing whether any Illinois sale actually occurred are the raw material of the motion. Identify the date the seller first learned of enforcement, because that date, not the date of judgment, frames the reasonable-time analysis. Determine whether the storefront’s physical address was disclosed to the marketplace or displayed publicly at the time of filing, because that fact largely decides the Article 1 question. Do not assume that earlier settlement correspondence has cost the seller anything. And develop every ground fully in the opening motion rather than saving it for reply.
For rights holders and their counsel, the mirror image is equally clear: build and document the address diligence before asking a court to authorize alternative service, and be prepared to demonstrate a completed sale into the forum as to each defendant rather than relying on the availability of one.
This article is provided for general information and does not constitute legal advice or create an attorney-client relationship. Cases are cited as of publication; readers should confirm current status before relying on them.

Joel M. Huotari is a partner at WilliamsMcCarthy LLP in Illinois. He handles trademark, copyright, and e-commerce enforcement and defense matters in the federal courts of Illinois and Wisconsin, including Schedule A litigation in the Northern District of Illinois.
Joel M. Huotari, Partner
WilliamsMcCarthy LLP
Email: jhuotari@wilmac.com
Phone: (815) 987-8982



